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KNOWLEDGE, POWER, AND UTILITY 
RANCIS BACON hopefully identified the  ends of nat- 
ural science and the  ends of man. His vision of a new re- 
lease of human energies in re-making the  world more nearly 
t o  the  heart's desire was of a kind t o  inspire enthusiasm. 
Deeming knowledge power, he eagerly expected the future 
t o  tell a story of human improvement. Man  need no longer 
submit helplessly t o  a blind and indifferent nature; but, 
armed with inductive methods, he could bring her under con- 
trol by adapting her routines t o  his purposes. With the power 
of control goes the promise of alleviation of human suffering. 
And so Bacon, hopefully, confidently, urged the scientific 
advancement of learning because of its utility in the promo- 
tion of man's well-being, 
Without rhetorical adornments, this thesis, tha t  human 
progress inevitably must accompany or follow scientific ad- 
vance, fails t o  command unhesitating assent. There seems 
no obvious reason for believing tha t  a knowledge of nature's 
ways involves either adequate wisdom or sufficient motiva- 
tion for the best use of the  power t o  which natural knowledge 
admittedly contributes. It is true of course that  every one of 
us in the West owes a debt of gratitude t o  the scientific 
guidance of medicine and engineering (to mention only the 
most obvious things). But the  military and political history 
of our half-century has also taught fear of the destructive 
potentialities of all types of modern science, from physics to  
psychology and sociology. It has taught us t o  be gravely 
suspicious of the philosophy of history implied in the idea of 
progress. T o  believe tha t  the  course of human affairs, viewed 
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over a sufficiently long interval of time, is progressive, is 
probably more difficult today than a t  any time in two hun- 
dred years. The great expectations attending the discovery 
and exploitation of new technical powers have been tem- 
pered by suffering. Experience has taught us skepticism, 
as speculative criticism alone cannot. It is no longer easy t o  
believe that human affairs will prosper as science advances; 
for who can say that human &airs will prosper, with or 
without further mastery of the forces of nature? 
In  this predicament the easily uttered admonition t o  use 
science wisely offers slight consolation. If our most assured 
knowledge affords scant guidance, whither shall we turn for 
the sorely needed wisdom? And what if our darkest doubt 
gains voice and whispers that perchance science is not so- 
cially a neutral instrument of human purposes, that  by its 
very nature i t  tends t o  stifle wisdom, while fostering new 
and uncontrollable evils? Like the Frankenstein fantasy, this 
pictures the master's enslavement by his own artifact. Some 
such fearful suspicion cannot be said to have been wholly 
absent a t  any time from men's minds. It has formed a popu- 
lar topic for moralizers who are fond of deploring the "Ma- 
chine Age." But seldom has science been so uncompromis- 
ingly charged with major social ills as in a recent book by 
Aldous Huxley, Science, Liberty and Peace (I), published 
shortly after the end of the war. 
Nobody would expect the author of the Brave New World 
to  commend the social tendencies of modern technology. 
That  satire of industrial utopia represents men, who had 
been artfully deprived of their essential humanity, as ant- 
like or machinelike workers, perfectly exemplifying the ideal 
of industrial efficiency. The thesis of the later work, that 
c c  Progressive science is one of the causative factors involved 
in the progressive decline of liberty and the progressive 
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centralization of power, which have occurred during the 
twentieth century," expresses the deeper insight that man, 
de-humanized, is inhuman rather than non-human, demonic 
rather than mechanical. He suspects science of necessarily 
contributing to  the creation of an inhumane society, in 
which the development of our spiritual capacities grows 
increasingly dificult. 
When he observes the current scene, science and tech- 
nology strike him as placing greater and greater power into 
the hands of a few. Plain men cannot hope to  challenge it. 
What can they oppose to  the new, technically advanced 
and enormously effective instruments of coercion and in- 
doctrination? The natural disposition of individuaIs to  re- 
sist tyrannous encroachments upon their liberties has a t  
the same time been undermined, as increasing numbers find 
themselves dependent for their livelihood, in agriculture as 
well as in industry, upon large-scale methods of production 
and distribution. Consider, moreover, the human organism. 
Like others, it has its native rhythms, and these set in- 
trinsic limits to  the rate a t  which it  can change its mode 
of life. The current rate of technological and social change 
exceeds this rate. Our organic ability to  adjust habits of 
life t o  new ways, places, people is unequal to  the imposed 
task; so that our society is kept in a state of chronic in- 
stability and insecurity. The net result, according to Huxley, 
is a general lack of moral, social, and economic equilibrium. 
Huxley thus charges science with direct complicity in 
creating major ills of the present age. He seems to wish t o  
say that  this complicity is in some way a consequence of 
the nature of science. Yet he does not wish to  imply that 
science could under no conditions have been employed for 
other ends. What he has in mind is, as he explains, that 
men of science begin by ignoring all that  does not lend it- 
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self to  measurement and to  explanation in terms of ante- 
cedent causes, and that this habit of mind, reinforced by 
success in mastering the energies of nature, tends t o  ex- 
tend itself over the whole range of human life, and to  dis- 
count as unreaI the qualities and values which remain in- 
scrutable to  its abstract understanding. Because of the sub- 
ject matter, methods, and attitudes appropriate to  its in- 
vestigations, science tends t o  encourage preoccupation with 
power rather than value. This is the ground of its natural 
complicity in the production of social evils. If this tendency 
is checked, Huxley thinks i t  will be the result of saintli- 
ness working against the natural inclination of that power- 
ful knowledge which commands the material energies of the 
world. Knowledge of the scientific sort is indeed power. 
"But power is not the same thing as insight." 
We point the contrast, and gain perspective, by listening 
for a moment to  Henri Poincar6, who combines the ex- 
perience of a creative mathematician with a truly Gallic 
gift for lucid thought and apt expression. Asserting that 
science is concerned with means, never with ends, he con- 
cludes "there can no more be immoral science than there 
can be scientific morals," (2)  I n  a general way, Huxley 
could agree. No doubt, the sole and sufficient legitimate 
aim of science is the ascertaining of truth; the employment 
of scientific discoveries for the advancement of other human 
purposes answers t o  criteria that  lie outside the competence 
of the scientist, in his capacity as scientist, to  discover- 
Beyond this point, however, disagreement begins between 
them, and the significance of Huxley's discussion emerges. 
Poincari: pays comparatively little heed to  the side of 
science that the instrumentalists, among others, stress; he 
makes little allowance for the widespread and penetrating 
influence of scientific technology on the circumstances of 
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life in the great nations. It, therefore, hardly occurs t o  him 
that the pure scientist shares responsibility for some of the 
least agreeable of those circumstances. This readiness to  
circumscribe the field of science springs, of course, from no 
mean inclination to  belittle the scientific activity. On the 
contrary, it reflects Poincar6's view of life's high purpose: 
"The search for truth," he says, Ccshould be the goal of our 
activities; i t  is the sole end worthy of them."(g) Thinking 
of knowledge in terms of truth rather than power, he could 
scarcely be expected to  have anticipated an attack like 
Huxley's. The notion that science could be among the 
causes of diminished human welfare might have seemed not 
only distasteful but absurd. For is not truth the sole end 
. . .  
worthy of our activities? 
When I speak here of truth (he explains) assuredly I refer t o  
scientific truth; but I also mean moral truth, of which what we 
call justice is only one aspect. It may seem that  I am misusing 
words, tha t  I combine thus under the same name two things 
having nothing in common; tha t  scientific truth, which is 
demonstrated, can in no way be likened to moral truth, which 
is felt. And yet  I cannot separate them, and whosoever loves 
the one cannot help loving the other. T o  find the one as  well 
as to  find the  other, it is necessary to  attain absolute sincerity. 
These two sorts of t ruth when discovered give the  same joy; 
each when perceived beams with t h e  same splendor, so that  w e  
must see i t  or close our eyes. (4) 
Dear, kind, innocent M. Poincari! Two wars and uneasy 
interims of anxious peace have taught us a grimmer truth. 
Or have they perchance blinded our eyes t o  the glory and 
the light? A simpIe faith, which is indistinguishable from 
the humility of a great spirit, lays hold, it may be, on a 
truth beyond the reach of the resourceful cunning of experi- 
mental intelligence. Yet we have been told otherwise by a 
generation of men who claim to  speak in the name of science, 
profess love of truth above all else, and in every way rnani- 
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fest almost fanatical devotion to  Descartes' first rule of 
method, that we accept nothing as true which we do not 
clearly recognize t o  be so. Still, this fastidious taste for re- 
fined and purified knowledge has found no truth that beams 
with splendor. It is in part the effect, as it most certainly 
is also a cause, of disillusionment, Some have come to see, 
or to  think they see, that moral truth is an illusion and 
that Poincari was, as he suggested, simply misusing words 
when he used 'truth' both of science and of morals. '?f 
one man affirms and another denies that pIeasure is good 
per re, what is the difference between them? My contention 
is that the two men differ as to  what they desire, but not 
as to  what they assert, since they assert nothing." The 
words are Bertrand Russell's,(5) 
Huxley is fully aware of these developments, and he is 
quite unable to  share Poincari's simple confidence that the 
scientific and the moral spirit are somehow necessarily a t  
one. While both deny that science deals with ends, one 
thinks of i t  as dealing with means; the other thinks of it as 
producing power. These are the same thing, yet how dif- 
ferent! They differ as the early and the middle years of this 
century; they differ as do confident hope and despair. For 
Poincari, ends lie beyond the field of scientific demonstra- 
tion; yet they do not, on that account, escape the grasp of 
reason; and he has faith that science, being rational, will 
naturally ally itself with the pursuit of reasonable ends 
generally. Huxley sees scientific knowledge as power, and 
rather ruefully turns t o  mystical religion for reassurance. 
Events have taught him distrust of power, and of science 
along with it; for, while science cannot fail to yield power, 
i t  may fail to  foster an enlightened and generous spirit. It 
may, to be sure, ~e r fo rm this service, and Poincari is one 
of many witnesses. But there is neither logical warrant for 
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asserting a necessary connection, nor empirical warrant for 
expecting a constant conjunction, between scientific compe- 
tence and moral wisdom. 
Francis Bacon himself had a moment of doubt. I n  the 
Preface to  The Great Instauration, in the midst of prepara- 
tions for the grand proclamation that "those twin objects, 
human knowledge and human power, do really meet in one," 
Bacon paused in mid-career. It was as if, in reflecting on 
the glories of the new age into which he was hastening his 
fellow man, his deepest mind had an uneasy premonition, 
and his unfailing pen recorded it, before purposeful atten- 
tion could search out more agreeable objects. In  that pass- 
ing moment he addressed 
one general admonition t o  all; tha t  they consider what are  
the true ends of knowledge and tha t  they seek i t  not  either for 
pleasure of the mind, or for contention, or for superiority t o  
others, or for profit, or fame, or power, or any of these inferior 
things; but  for the benefit and use of life; and t h a t  they per- 
fect and govern it  in charity. For i t  was from lust of power tha t  
the angels fell, from lust of knowledge tha t  man fell; but  of 
charity there can be no excess . . . 
His misgivings were apparently not deeply felt. Bacon 
proceeds at  once to  declare that he is "laboring to lay the 
foundation, not of any sect or doctrine, but of human utility 
and power." That easy, carelessly optimistic juxtaposition 
of utility and power, as if they go inevitably together, was 
immeasurably prophetic. It is a cardinal metaphysicaI fal- 
lacy of modern industria1 society. Do men, already fallen 
through lust of knowledge, have nothing to fear from lust 
of power? If knowledge and power do really meet in one, can 
we discount the risks of power and prove a necessary con- 
nection between knowledge and utility? 
It is Huxley's opinion that we cannot. But many would 
remain unpersuaded, especially in view of the fact that 
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Huxley proposes mysticism as the alternative t o  the scien- 
tific direction of life. They would complain, not without 
reason, that  he has given a distorted picture of science and 
its potentialities, and has charged against it evils which re- 
sult from men's acting in almost wilful ignorance of the 
clues science affords to  a better life. As undisturbed by the 
events of the past decades as by pessimistic strictures like 
HuxIey's, they retain their faith in the saving grace of 
natural science. Common arguments to  justify i t  fall readily 
into three classes. (a) Some claim that  the ~ e s u l t s  or con- 
clusions of science define norms of moral action, even in- 
cluding man's chief end. (b) Some conceive of scientific 
method as the sole intelligent way of dealing with our prob- 
lems of all kinds, and conclude that  the only ultimate hope 
of improving our human lot lies in the extended use of 
scientific methods; since it may be taken as axiomatic that  
life cannot be well Iived if unintelligently lived. (c) The 
third class of arguments for a faith in the utiIity of the 
powers conferred by scientific knowledge, is based on a 
markedly different analysis of the scientific mind or attitude 
from Huxley's. It is pointed out that  scientific inquisitive- 
ness naturally demands for its satisfaction the most scrupu- 
lous disinterestedness and objectivity of mind, the most un- 
qualified respect for facts, irrespective of our desires. These 
clearly being features no less indispensable t o  moral integ- 
rity than t o  cognitive fidelity, it is forthwith inferred that  
the scientific attitude is an essential condition of the moral 
conduct of life. 
None of these arguments is satisfactory. Their flaws, how- 
ever, are instructive, for they point to a familiar distinction, 
which has been neglected at  the cost of considerable con- 
fusion. The kind of knowledge which serves wisdom must 
be clearly conceived and distinguished from the kind which 
Knowledge, Power, and Utility 
tends to  generate techniques, Philosophical understanding 
of man and the world in which he finds himself immersed 
has a special purpose not t o  be fully satisfied by the scien- 
tific articulation of perceptual matters of fact. Clarity will 
hardly be achieved as long as so vital a distinction is passed 
over or obscured. Huxley himself is, i t  seems, a case in 
point. He offers us but two alternatives: either science or 
religious mysticism. By implication, he apparently agrees 
with scientism in the  identification of all reasoned knowl- 
edge with the positive sciences. 
Our tradition recognizes the further alternative of Rea- 
son. Reason is no less loyal than scientific understanding to  
ideals of logical and empirical integrity, but i t  is also loyal 
t o  the ideals of Beauty and Goodness, as ultimately ines- 
capable aspects of an adequate ideal of Truth. This is too 
large and difficult a theme t o  be treated in this narrow 
context. It will be enough here, if we succeed in showing 
that  the weakness of the scientistic arguments points toward 
the  vital persistence of the  tradition of humanistic reason. 
(a) The  argument from the results of science attempts t o  
convince us tha t  some facts of positive science possess in- 
trinsic ethical meaning, which is objective in the same 
sense as its factual content. It has been made familiar by 
the many discussions, popular or technical, which begin by 
tacitly or openly identifying evolution and progress, and 
end by claiming tha t  the "upward" course of evolution 
points the way t o  our true good. Or the argument may 
take a more piecemeal form, identifying empirically de- 
termined optimum or normal values (e.g., 98.6' F., the  
normal oral temperature for the  human body) with ethical 
norms. 
This latter argument lies near a t  hand wherever the  
"right" amount of any factor has been determined objec- 
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tively for given circumstances. If under such circumstances 
we wish t o  do the "right" thing, i t  seems obvious that  we 
must provide the "right" amount of the factor in question. 
Scientific results thus have intrinsic ethical significance. A 
useful example of this sort of argument has been provided 
by the English geneticist, C. H. Waddington. He considers 
as ethical judgments statements such as " 'You are an ani- 
mal of such a kind that  you must consume 7 mgm. of 
vitamin C per diem, and should consume IOO mgm.'," and 
contends that they are "statements of the same kind . . . as 
scientific statements."(6) Waddington's purpose, a t  this 
point, is primarily to  discredit the idea that ethicaI judg- 
ments are nothing but disguised commands. I n  this he may 
have succeeded, but he does not prove the conclusion that 
ethical and scientific statements are of the same kind. I f  
this were correct, scientific investigation would be a sub- 
stitute for ethical reflection-and the pharmacopoeia a book 
of wisdom? 
The  example before us is manifestly a case of the hypo- 
thetical imperative: If you desire A, then you must adopt 
B as a minimum, and should adopt C as an optimum 
means. This has a scientific content, the reference t o  the 
fact that  B (or C) will generally produce A, other things 
being equal. It does not imply that  A is ethically derirable. 
The suggestion that i t  does involves an ignoratio elenchi. 
The argument shows only that  ethical judgments make use 
of scientific knowledge, but not, as it ought, that  its ethical 
content has scientific warrant. To  prescribe an adequate 
diet for, let us say, the  inmates of an insane asylum, it is 
useful to  know how much vitamin C they need. Does this 
help us to  decide whether the insane (and other socially 
useless individuals) should be kept alive a t  all? The specific 
problem of the man of science is to  find a reliable average 
Knowledge, Power, and Utility I1 
dose, minimum or optimum. The research which yields an 
answer t o  that problem does not prove that 'you', the par- 
ticular individual who you are, 'must' or 'should' take this 
amount or that. Ethically, each case may be a special case; 
ethically, there may be some who should not take the opti- 
mum or even the minimum dose prescribed by the scientific 
rule. The undisputed cognitive generality of the rule does 
not entail deliberate application t o  every individual, unless 
the unique value of each individual is independently as- 
sumed. Science characteristically considers, and treats, the 
individual as a "case", an instance of a possible law. Ethi- 
cal judgment, on the other hand, takes an interest in a 
scientific generalization only if it shows how to  help an 
individual. The contrast is ineradicable and crucial. 
The argument which finds in evolution the clue t o  a sci- 
entificafly respectable definition of the good suffers from 
essentially similar defects. It confuses the determination of 
a fact with the evaluation of its moral significance for our- 
selves, and attaches no value to  the individual man, since 
individuals have no biological significance save as bearers 
of the evolutionary process. It, nevertheless, has special 
interest because i t  exposes these difficulties on a cosmic 
scale and makes its metaphysical assumptions unmistakable. 
The kind of argument in question is familiar. The course 
of evolution, taken on the whole or as a whole, manifests a 
single trend from less t o  more comprehensive life. Scien- 
tists have painstakingly traced it  from the simplest proto- 
zoa to  the highest civilized societies (which, biologically 
considered, represent only a further evolutionary stage of 
organic life), This great fact, the central fact for all biology, 
is supposed to provide an empirical, objective conception 
of the good, free from taint of personal bias, prejudice, and 
arbitrary preference. 
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Let us pass over the doubt that freedom from bias is to  
be bought so cheaply, and attend t o  the serious ambiguity 
of the argument. It does not make clear whether it assumes 
that the trend of evolution is good because i t  is a fact or is 
a fact because i t  is good. It cannot have it both ways. It 
must assume either that  the good is eJected in the course 
of evolution or that  i t  is effective in it. But neither alterna- 
tive is satisfactory. I n  the former case, we are required t o  
admit the actual tendency of the evolutionary process to  
be good, whether or not i t  Jeernr so to anybody. Thus we 
must adopt a sort of naturalistic scotism, piously accepting 
(on unempirical grounds of faith) that what evolved must 
be good because it has evolved. If we accept the other al- 
ternative, namely, that what evolves must have evolved 
because i t  was good, or for the sake of the good, then we 
are committed t o  assigning a decisive role t o  purposive 
choice and discriminating evaluation in the evoIutionary 
process. The good, whether immanent or transcendent, could 
not otherwise be effective. A correct scientific understanding 
of evolutionary facts,therefore,would depend on a sound sense 
of values, and not the reverse, as the argument requires. 
The evoIutionary argument distorts what may be an im- 
portant truth. It seems t o  presuppose that good purposes 
tend to  succeed and to  shape the ultimate course of human 
events. But i t  should not be overlooked that this is a syn- 
thetic proposition. That  well-being attends goodness (in- 
cidentally, a major thesis of Plato's Republic) is empirically 
meaningful only if goodness is somehow identifiable inde- 
pendently of a historical fact about it. Ultimately, we can- 
not regard ethical judgments as nothing but a peculiar type 
of scientific statement. 
(b) The argument from method is drawn from a peculiar 
emphasis on the art  of experiment as the best, if not sole, 
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intelligent way t o  go about the  accomplishment of our pur- 
poses. It is the only flexible, self-correcting, deliberate, 
planned and organized way men have found t o  meet their 
difficulties and soIve their problems. I n  the final analysis, 
we are told, even theoretical problems are practical, re- 
quiring for their solution the  invention or discovery of 
methods which actually remove the  difficulty. Life itself is 
a proIonged practical problem, made up of countless de- 
tailed, sometimes difficult, adjustments t o  an ever-changing 
natural and (in the  case of men) social milieu. Each diffi- 
culty must be removed in succession as the organism, or 
man, achieves balanced interaction with his environment. 
When this occurs, the  difficulty no longer exists, no matter 
how the result came about. T h e  individual may have acted 
blindly, routinely, or frantically. Or he may have proceeded 
intelligently t o  analyse the  situation, t o  project imaginative- 
ly the  probable outcome of certain possible lines of action, 
and t o  put the  most promising plan or hypothesis t o  the 
test of actual experience. T h e  'right' plan will show itself 
by restoring easefuI equilibrium. If such, as we are told, is 
the  nature of intelligence, then unintelligent behavior must 
be the only alternative t o  the scientific direction of life. 
Now, as John Dewey has put it, "To cIaim that  intelli- 
gence is a better method than its alternatives, authority, 
imitation, caprice, and ignorance, prejudice and passion, is 
hardly an excessive claim."(7) So much granted, the con- 
clusion of the argument from method follows irresistibly: 
Science is the great guide of human life. Thus is Bacon's 
vision vindicated in sophisticated terms of modern self- 
conscious experimentalism. 
Let us protect ourselves against the ~ersuasive charm of 
these thoughts by recalling Huxley7s antithetical concIusion. 
Are both sides speaking of the  same thing, when one claims 
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that science alone can save us, while the other warns that 
science alone (by itself) will mislead us? Huxley seems t o  
have in view primariIy the science of the physicists, the 
chemists, and so on. The other side (let us caIl i t  "instru- 
mentalism") speaks of this also, but only as a special case 
of the general method of intelligence. The issue thus seems 
to  turn on what is assumed in the idea of intelligence by 
instrumentalism. 
Almost by definition of instrumentalism, intelligence is 
instrumental t o  the natural ends of Iife. It is a means, and 
the critic can t ry  for a quick victory by urging that  the 
elaboration of means in science and technoIogy is not the 
same as the clarification of ends. "Power is not the same 
thing as insight." It, nevertheless, is premature t o  cele- 
brate victory. For the instrumentalist will reject what he 
considers an arbitrary confinement of the range of intelli- 
gence. His analysis shows him that the same experimental 
approach which perfects means also purifies our ends. If 
we endeavor after inferior things, the test of action will 
school us. Nature will teach whether the outcome really 
satisfies, or not,-whether an harmonious equilibrium actu- 
ally prevails in nature. This, it will be added, triumphantly, 
is the only way we have of intelligently enriching our per- 
ception of the good. A good that cannot be known as an 
enrichment of experience is no good at all, but an illusion. 
Real or true goods are those that  may be actually won. Life 
demands of us an ever-enlarging repertory of methods of 
concretely achieving detailed goods in existence. Moreover, 
each new end achieved becomes an incentive, a means t o  
further accomplishment. New goods become practical pos- 
sibilities. Thus, the scientific method of trying things out 
and judging carefully the results is the condition of a gen- 
uine growth in wisdom, and the only condition within our 
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power. It may be that  wisdom may also be conferred, as 
by an act of divine grace. Grace is not commanded; what 
is in our power is t o  seek. Instrumentalism has the faith 
that if we seek, we shall find. 
Here is truth which "beams with splendor." To  neglect 
it, as does HuxIey, is to  lose a treasure. But a nagging doubt 
remains. I f  science is the method of this liberating intelli- 
gence, why is i t  that its triumphal advance in the modern 
age has been attended by such aggravated evils? 
For this, too, instrumentalism has a ready answer: the 
methods of intelligence have not been widely applied. Sci- 
ence has grown rapidly, and has released the constructive 
forces in the modern world. Old institutions and bad habits 
survive the change. They, not having been touched by sci- 
entific reform, are responsible for the spreading evils of the 
modern world.(8) We need more intelligence, not less. 
Are we really entitled to hold both that science has trans- 
formed modern life and that i t  has not affected some insti- 
tutions, like capitalism? Are we really able t o  believe these 
institutions have been perpetuated by unintelligent men 
acting without advice from the sciences? The leaders of the 
world generally know quite well what they want. A generous 
mind may, no doubt, find their ends cramped, even in- 
jurious to  their fellow men. Just the same, they make use 
of the sciences, but not without concessions to a prior com- 
mitment. This retards the growth of adequate moral pur- 
poses. Ultimately, i t  may be, these men are unwise; but 
that does not mean that they do not proceed deliberately 
and experimentally with objective methods. There is a dis- 
tinction between science with and without a prior commit- 
ment, between an interested and a disinterested experimen- 
talism. Bacon's contrast of experiments of light with experi- 
ments of fruit herein acquires its full significance. Ideally, 
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the scientist in his own field always wants t o  know more 
and better. When interested motives come into play, peo- 
ple generally cease t o  deri~e to  know better-not a t  the 
risk of what they prize. Their weakness is not the lack of 
method, in the sense of technique, but want of an educated 
will or conscience. The critical factor thus turns out t o  be, 
not method as program or plan of action, but method as 
poIicy, attitude, or frame of mind and will. 
This brings t o  light, a t  last, the true character of the 
disagreement between Huxley and these friends of experi- 
ment. We saw that Huxley distrusts science because of the 
attitude of mind it fosters. Instrumentalism trusts the sci- 
entific frame of mind because it tacitly identifies i t  with a 
moral attitude of will. Dewey himself has described the 
experimental method as the method "of a positive toleration 
which amounts to  sympathetic regard for the intelligence 
and personality of others, even if they hold views opposed 
to  ours, and of scientific inquiry into facts and testing of 
ideas."@) The argument from method rests upon the argu- 
ment from attitude. 
(c) If the attitude of positive toleration is decisive, a good 
method must presuppose a good wilI. A good will may be 
conceived to  be one that relates itself affirmatively t o  all 
beings who enjoy a personal mode of existence. It is the 
attitude of a person using all his powers actively, to do his 
part, large or small, toward sustaining a harmony of per- 
sonal life. This attitude involves both toleration and re- 
spect for personal existence as such. That is t o  say, i t  is 
both disinterested and personal. It is disinterested in the 
sense that all private and merely individual inclinations 
and ambitions are subordinated to  a universal vision. It is 
personal in the sense that  in any actual situation the con- 
trolling ends of action are persons. I n  the moral attitude 
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the  agent relates himself to  others as subject t o  subject, not 
as subject t o  object, t o  borrow A. A, Bowman's expression. 
The scientific attitude is disinterested, but i t  is imper- 
~ o n a l .  Therein Iies its great strength, that  it ignores final 
causes; and its weakness, for it ignores the moral ends of 
action. It converts whatever i t  touches into objects and 
subordinates every other concern t o  its ambition t o  deter- 
mine, if not the sum of all matters of fact, a t  least the grand 
order of nature. And so i t  is that  men of science, whose 
minds are more habituated t o  processes of objective in- 
quiry than t o  those of critical reflection, sometimes over- 
look the personal dimension of life and, on grounds of dis- 
interestedness alone, attribute t o  the scientific attitude vir- 
tues which can belong only t o  the moral person.(lo) It is 
easy to  forget the abstractness of specifically scientific in- 
quiry. So far we may follow HuxleyJs lead. 
On the  other hand, an equally grave complementary 
error, indeed a double error, is also possible; for we may 
carelessly conclude tha t  all morality falls like a ready-made 
thing in the bare will, and all intelligence falls on the side 
of science. Tha t  would, as Huxley does, make the will intel- 
lectually irresponsible and science morally irrelevant. It 
would then be impossible t o  understand either how Socra- 
tes could have thought that  virtue is knowledge, or how 
more recent thinkers could believe that  the scientific is the  
moral attitude, or that  knowledge is virtue. It thus seems 
necessary t o  hold, on the one hand, that  the scientific atti- 
tude a t  its best includes, as one of its necessary conditions, 
a kind of self-controI which is unmistakably moral or akin to  
the moral, and, on the other hand, that  a ~ e r s o n a l  ife must 
include the utmost possible development of intelligence. 
The  argument from scientific attitude or scientific method 
is plausible just t o  the extent that  i t  relies on what this 
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attitude borrows from and contributes to  genuine morali- 
ty. What it contributes is, first of all, a dispassionate habit 
of mind; second, a habit of free, self-disciplined association 
with others in a community defined by devotion to  a com- 
mon ideal (truth); and, third, an enhanced ability to  rec- 
ognize one's actual situation and opportunities for purposes 
of moral judgment. These contributions have often been 
praised, and their value is beyond dispute. Any sensitive 
morality, as Dewey has so rightly taught, will welcome a11 
objective aids and refreshments. 
But the scientific attitude aIso borrows something. When, 
for example, Hocking says of the empirical study of nature 
that "It meant keeping man's self-interest and self-impor- 
tance rigorously out of his study of nature's ways. Modern 
science . . . is founded on a methodical unselfishness,"(~r) 
he echoes Bacon's declaration: 
For my own part a t  least, in obedience to the everlasting 
love of truth, I have committed myself to the uncertainties and 
difficulties and solitudes of the ways . , . in the hope of pro- 
viding a t  last for the present and future generations guidance 
more faithful and secure. Wherein if I have made any progress, 
the way has been opened to  me by no other means than the 
true and legitimate humiliation of the human spirit. (12) 
This means that science has borrowed its inspiration part- 
ly from that deep awe and unrest which reflects man's need 
to  understand his ultimate condition, and partly from gen- 
eral humanitarian motives. The latter appear to  be the 
social form, peculiarly modern, of the moral concern; the 
former can be divorced with difficulty, if a t  all, from a final 
religious reference. This joining together of religion and mo- 
rality and reason is one of the deepest and most creative 
Western traditions, which attained philosophical expression 
for the first time through Socrates and Plato, was spiritually 
deepened by the influence of Christianity, inspired the first 
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stages of modern science, and continues to speak through 
the mouths of men like Poincari-and Dewey. According 
to  this tradition, the aim of knowledge is truth, and its re- 
suIts are wisdom and righteousness. This is the classic tra- 
dition in which virtue is self-knowledge, and wisdom is 
sought as a form of moral perfection. But about the posi- 
tivistic temper of industrialized modern science, Huxley is 
right. It belongs to  another tradition, in which knowledge 
is power, a temptation rather than a victory. 
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